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ABSTRACT 
How to Make Head or Tail of ‘Bridging’ and ‘Bonding’?:  
Addressing the Methodological Ambiguity  
by Benny Geys * 
A distinction has recently been proposed between bridging (or encompassing) 
and bonding (or inward-looking) social networks. However, existing theoretical 
contributions remain vague as to the fundamental meaning of both concepts. As 
a consequence, two distinct interpretations have evolved alongside each other. 
In the present paper, we employ data on voluntary association membership in 
Flanders to empirically illustrate that both approaches can lead to substantially 
different outcomes and therefore appear to tap into different dimensions of 
bridging versus bonding. These findings underline the problematic nature of the 
current conceptual ambiguity. We conclude that should the bridging-bonding 
distinction add meaningfully to our understanding of the external effects of 
social networks, it is essential to resolve the conceptual and methodological 
imprecision. 
 
Keywords: Voluntary associations, bridging and bonding, social networks, membership 
heterogeneity, social interconnections  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Wie ist ‘Briding vs. Bonding’ sozialer Netzwerke zu verstehen? Das 
Problem der methodischen Zweideutigkeit   
In jüngster Zeit wurde eine Unterscheidung zwischen brückenschlagenden 
(übergreifenden) und bindenden (nach innen gerichteten) sozialen Netzwerken 
vorgeschlagen. Die theoretischen Beiträge bleiben dabei aber was die funda-
mentale Bedeutung beider Konzepte angeht ungenau. So haben sich parallel 
zwei unterschiedliche Interpretationen entwickelt. Im vorliegenden Artikel zeigen 
wir empirisch auf der Grundlage von Daten zu freiwilligen Vereinsmitglied-
schaften in Flandern, dass beide Ansätze stark differierende Ergebnisse liefern 
und somit augenscheinlich die Frage „bridging“ versus „bonding“ in verschiede-
nen Dimensionen betrachten. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Problematik 
der aktuellen konzeptionellen Zweideutigkeit der Ansätze. Wir folgern, dass 
sowohl die konzeptionellen als auch die methodischen Ungenauigkeiten 
beseitigt werden müssen, wenn die Unterscheidung von ‘bridging‘ und ‘bonding‘ 
bedeutsamen Einfluss auf das Verständnis von externen Effekten durch soziale 
Netzwerke nehmen soll.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, a large quantity of academic studies links civic engagement to numerous 
positive social, political and economic outcomes (see Halpern 2005, for a review). While not 
the only possible explanation, one popular rationale for this link states that the ‘embedded 
resources in social networks [i.e. ‘social capital’] enhance the outcomes of actions’ (Lin 2001: 
19).  More specifically, this literature stresses that active engagement in, for example, 
voluntary organizations creates a setting in which social trust, norms and values can develop 
(Putnam 1993; Stolle and Rochon 1998) and spill over beyond the immediate group (a 
‘rainmaker’ effect; e.g. Putnam and Pharr 2000; Harell and Stolle 2006; Newton 2006).  This 
‘remarkable and often unqualified belief in the value of civic engagement’ (Hill and 
Matsubayashi 2005: 223) has often been (gratefully) embraced by policy-makers at the turn of 
the millennium to set up policy initiatives supporting the ‘civil society’.  For example, when 
Tony Blair first took office as UK Prime Minister in 1997, he underlined his plan to recover 
social life in the United Kingdom (a policy objective popular among many so-called ‘Third 
Way’ politicians such as former US president Bill Clinton or former German chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder).  Many governments also contemplated modifying the broader institutional 
structure in which voluntary associations worked so as to encourage them to assume a more 
active role in public provision at the local level. 
 
The academic literature suggesting that civic engagement is normatively positive has, 
however, been questioned on conceptual, methodological as well as analytical grounds (e.g. 
Harriss and De Renzio 1997; Anheier and Kendall 2002; Quibria 2003; Hallberg and Lund 
2005).  For example, some scholars appear to conflate cause and consequence by stating that 
‘social capital is defined by its function’ (Coleman 1988: S98).  Hence, the theoretical basis 
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‘appears to have a circular or tautological character’ (Anheier and Kendall 2002: 352; see also 
Portes, 1998).  Also, most of this literature disregards the wider institutional design of the 
state.  Yet, the ‘role played by civil society organizations will depend crucially on the wider 
political setting (…) and are actually very powerfully influenced by political institutions’ 
(Harriss and De Renzio 1997: 927-928; see also Anheier and Kendall 2002: 355).   
 
One recurrent point of conceptual criticism, important for the present study, concerns the 
tendency in this literature to bring forward a ‘romanticized image of community – with its 
concomitant neglect of the negative aspects of sociability’ (Harriss and De Renzio 1997: 926; 
see also Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1988; Levi 1996; Foley and Edwards 1998; DeFilippis 
2001; Li et al. 2003).  These ‘dark sides’ of civic engagement include ‘market distortions, 
moral hazards, restrictions to individual freedoms and perpetuation of backward norms’ 
(Quibria 2003: 29; see also Portes, 1998) as well as alienating members from the larger 
society (cfr. Bobo 1988; Lipset and Marks 2000; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Abrams, Hogg 
and Marquez 2005; Münster 2007) or trapping them in disadvantaged situations (cfr. 
Bourdieu 1985).  Hence, while civic engagement represents access to ‘social capital for some 
[, it] implies social exclusion for others’ (Harriss and De Renzio 1997: 926; see also Li et al. 
2003). 
 
To accommodate this less favourable feature of social networks, it has recently been 
suggested to make a distinction between bridging (or encompassing) social networks and 
bonding (or inward-looking) ones (e.g. Paxton 1999, 2002; Putnam 2000).  We argue that this 
distinction, while a necessary first step at addressing the need to distinguish various types of 
civic engagement, is at present equally plagued by conceptual and methodological problems.  
While we concentrate on the latter, we should point out that both types of civic engagement 
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appear to be characterised in terms of their expected outcome.  That is, the distinction allows 
the incorporation of negative external effects of civic engagement by, essentially, stereotyping 
bridging social networks as good and bonding ones as bad (on the argument that the former 
allow for a more general form of reciprocity and trust-development; see, e.g., Marshall and 
Stolle 2004).  ‘Bridging social capital is therefore important (…) because it suggests that 
‘good’ social capital is produced’ (Roberts and Devine 2003: 308).  Clearly, however, such 
stereotyping may be inaccurate as bonding networks can fulfil a useful social function by 
providing a vital source of support to people who suffer from bad health or socio-economic 
hardship (cfr. Szreter and Woolcock 2004; Brisson and Usher 2007).   
 
Importantly, the conceptual ambiguity undermining the value of the bridging-bonding 
distinction also generates methodological problems in measuring both concepts.  In fact, the 
theoretical vagueness allows for a variety of interpretations.  In effect, two different 
methodological approaches to measure bridging versus bonding social networks have 
developed: one based on interconnections between different networks (Paxton 2002) and one 
based on socio-economic heterogeneity within any given network (Stolle and Rochon 1998; 
Stolle 2001).  In our empirical analysis, we explicitly set both approaches against one another 
(using data on voluntary association membership in Flanders).  Based on their use of similar 
terminology and the same conceptual background, one would expect similar results.  This, 
however, is not the case.  Firstly, we find that both approaches at times fail to identify the 
same social networks as predominantly bridging or bonding.  Secondly, the relationship 
between an individual’s memberships in different types of associations and his/her civic 
attitudes is affected by the approach taken to distinguish bridging from bonding networks.  
While future comparative research should substantiate the general nature of these findings, 
they at least appear to invalidate the idea that both methodological approaches quantify the 
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same thing.  At best, one might argue they tap into different aspects of the bridging-bonding 
division.  These findings therefore underline the conceptual ambiguity plaguing the present 
theoretical literature and illustrate that we, at present, cannot be certain what is indicated by 
‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the bridging-bonding distinction 
and presents both methodologies proposed to empirically operationalize this distinction.  Both 
approaches are illustrated using data on voluntary association membership in Flanders.  In 
Section 3, we compare both approaches on two grounds: i.e. whether they designate the same 
networks as predominantly bridging/bonding and whether the relation between individual’s 
memberships in bridging/bonding networks and their civic attitudes is affected by the 
approach taken.  The last section concludes.  
 
2. Two views of bridging versus bonding social networks1 
 
In an attempt to accommodate for the ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ sides of civic engagement or, more 
generally, for the varying effects different types of social networks may have, a distinction 
has recently been proposed between bridging and bonding social networks (Paxton 1999, 
2002; Putnam 2000).  Bonding networks thereby refer to the type of civic engagement that 
‘brings together people who are like one another in important respects (ethnicity, age, gender, 
social class, and so on)’ (Putnam and Goss 2002: 11).  Bridging networks, on the other hand, 
‘bring together people who are unlike one another’ (Putnam and Goss 2002: 11).2   
 
While this general distinction between bridging and bonding civic engagement has a clear 
foundation and purpose, it remains vague.  As a consequence, two distinct interpretations 
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have been brought forward in empirical applications.  A first group of scholars focuses on the 
socio-economic heterogeneity of membership within organizations based on the idea that 
associations with a more heterogeneous membership constitute, in themselves, a platform for 
cross-cutting ties across social groups (Stolle and Rochon 1998; Putnam 2000; Stolle 2001; Li 
et al. 2003).  Paxton (2002), on the other hand, concentrates on associations’ 
interconnectedness to the wider community (i.e between various organizations) when defining 
bridging and bonding networks.  The underlying idea here is that bridging socio-economic 
divides need not necessarily arise within a given social network, but might predominantly 
result from overlapping networks (Stolle and Hooghe 2003).   
 
These two views are mirrored in two methodologies to empirically gauge the 
bridging/bonding character of social networks.  To explain both methods (in sections 2.1 and 
2.2 respectively) and compare them (in section 3), we rely on data taken from five surveys 
conducted between 1999 and 2004 by the Administration Planning and Statistics (APS) of the 
Flemish Government, providing a total sample of 7276 individuals.  The key variable for our 
analyses is respondents’ membership (active or passive) in different types of voluntary 
associations (e.g. hobby clubs, sports clubs, women’s associations, and so on).3  Importantly, 
while similar data are used in the studies originally proposing both methodologies compared 
here (i.c. Stolle and Rochon 1998; Paxton 2002; Coffé and Geys 2007a, b), they are not ideal.  
The reason is that they refer to associational types, and not individual organizations.4  
Nevertheless, though this aggregation issue should lead to caution in interpreting the results, it 
does not invalidate the methodologies proposed nor our evaluation and comparison of them.  
The caveat mentioned here should, however, be kept in mind. 
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2.1. Bridging and bonding via socio-economic heterogeneity of association membership 
 
When distinguishing bonding and bridging associations via the (socio-economic) composition 
of association membership, it is assumed that bridging social capital is likely to be fostered 
most by ‘memberships in associations that are representative of the larger society’ (Stolle and 
Rochon 1998: 64n).  In other words, over- or under-representation of certain socio-economic 
groups in the association indicates a lack of bridging potential within the organization (Stolle 
and Rochon 1998; Coffé and Geys 2007a).5  An extensive account of the empirical method to 
distinguish between bridging and bonding associations based on this approach is available in 
Coffé and Geys (2007a).  Hence, we only briefly reiterate the main elements here.   
 
In a first step, a ‘diversity score’ is calculated as the average absolute difference between the 
population composition and an association’s membership composition on a number of socio-
economic traits (the number of traits can be chosen by the researcher, though inclusion of 
more characteristics improves the reliability of the results).6  Then these raw scores are 
normalized between 0 and 1.  That is, the largest diversity score across all voluntary 
associations on a given socio-economic trait is set to 1, the smallest to 0 and the intermediate 
values rescaled to lie within this range.  This normalization guarantees that no dimension is 
(implicitly) weighted more heavily than another (cfr. Bowen and Moesen 2007) – which is 
theoretically appealing in the absence of clear criteria concerning such weighing differences.  
In a third and final step, the normalized diversity scores are added across all socio-economic 
traits for each association.  This ‘sum of normalized diversity scores’-index lies, by definition, 
between 0 and the number of socio-economic traits included.  A smaller value of the index 
indicates congruence between the association’s membership and the overall population 
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composition.  Associations at the lower (higher) end of the scale are therefore seen as 
predominantly bridging (bonding) (Stolle and Rochon 1998; Coffé and Geys 2007a).  
__________________ 
Table I 
about here 
__________________ 
 
The results from applying this method to the APS data introduced above are given in Table I.  
They are obtained by comparing membership composition in 16 association types with the 
Flemish population’s composition on eight socio-economic dimensions (i.c. age, gender, 
education level, religion, nationality, professional category, marital status and whether or not 
one has children).7  Specifically, Column 2 presents the sum of normalized diversity scores.  
The position of the associations on a scale from most bridging (1) to most bonding (16) is 
given between brackets.  It is clear that hobby clubs, associations for artistic activities and 
humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross are designated as the most bridging in the 
sample.  The other side of the bridging/bonding divide is populated by women’s associations 
and associations for retired people.   
 
2.2. Bridging and bonding through interconnections between associations 
 
Association members’ affiliations in other associations can be argued to generate 
‘organizational embeddedness’ (Cornwell and Harrison 2004: 863) and create ‘bridges’ 
between organizations.  Hence, a second approach to separating bridging from bonding 
organizations is to look at their connections to the wider organizational community (Paxton, 
2002; Coffé and Geys, 2007b).  However, although intuitively appealing, simply counting the 
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interconnections between associations is biased towards observing that larger organizations 
are more isolated (or bonding) than smaller ones.  The reason is that, since all links are 
necessarily symmetric, ‘the size of the groups distinguished by a given parameter is inversely 
related to the extent of their intergroup relations’ (Blau 1977: 24).  Fortunately, running a 
simple regression model with the observed number of interconnections (i.e. average number 
of additional memberships in association i; CONNECTi) as the dependent variable and the 
membership level of the associations (MEMBi) as the explanatory variable alleviates this bias.  
The residuals of this regression model denote the bridging or bonding nature of each 
association net of the membership size effect.  That is, higher (lower) residuals indicate that an 
association is more (less) bridging, given their differences in membership size (for more 
details, see Coffé and Geys, 2007b).8  
__________________ 
Table II 
about here 
__________________ 
 
Applying this method to the Flemish data employed above leads to the results in Table II.  
The associations in the sample are given in Column (1) while the number of individuals 
claiming membership in each of these is given in Column (2).  Column (3) contains the 
residuals from the above-mentioned regression.9  The results show that organizations for third 
world development and international peace and socio-cultural associations are most 
interconnected and thus most bridging.  At the other end of the bridging/bonding divide, we 
find associations linked to the local pub and those for retired people.   
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3. Comparing bridging within and between associations 
 
We are now in a position to consider whether or not both interpretations of (or methodological 
approaches to) bridging versus bonding social networks lead to analogous results.  If so, they 
are likely to be measuring the same thing (as they claim to do).  Although the literature might 
then still benefit from merging the information of both methods into one more generalized 
measure, at least the theoretical/conceptual ambiguity noted in the introduction does not spill 
over into empirical analyses.  If, on the other hand, both approaches lead to different results, 
they at best tap into different dimensions of bridging versus bonding.  In that case, the 
literature not only suffers from conceptual fuzziness, but also from methodological 
uncertainty when measuring bridging versus bonding.   
 
The analysis here proceeds in two steps.  First, in section 3.1, we explore whether both 
approaches rank associations similarly on the bridging-bonding divide.  Second, in section 
3.2, we assess whether members of bridging (rather than bonding) associations have more 
pro-social civic attitudes (as expected by, e.g., Putnam 2000; Putnam and Goss 2002; 
Marshall and Stolle 2004) and, crucially, whether this relation is affected by the approach to 
distinguish bridging from bonding networks. 
 
3.1 Internal bridging/bonding networks are external bridging/bonding networks? 
 
To attest whether the two methodological approaches rank social networks (in this case 
voluntary associations) similarly on the bridging-bonding divide, we compare the results 
presented in Tables I and II.  Youth groups, women’s organizations and associations for the 
elderly display low bridging potential when using either of the described methods.  
 11
Neighbourhood committees, organizations for arts activities and those providing aid to the 
elderly, handicapped and deprived are placed towards the bridging side of the divide in both 
methods.  Clearly, however, various groups show strong shifts in the ranking depending on 
the method used.  Hobby clubs, for example, are the most bridging association type under the 
internal bridging method, whereas they are placed at the bonding side of the spectrum using 
the interconnectedness measure.  The reverse (i.e. high external bridging potential but low 
internal bridging potential) is observed for associations for third world development and 
international peace.   
 
Calculating correlation coefficients between both sets of results reveals that both approaches 
to bridging and bonding are not significantly related to one another at the 5% level (r = -0.34; 
p = 0.20).  Moreover, the rankings of association types on a scale from most bridging to most 
bonding are also only weakly related (Pearson rank-order correlation = 0.28; p = 0.29).  
Hence, high external bridging potential does not necessarily signify high internal bridging 
potential (or vice versa).  This implies that the two methodological approaches proposed in 
the literature are conceptually as well as empirically different.  They do not appear to capture 
the same thing.   
 
3.2. Internal and external bridging and members’ civic attitudes 
 
Given the designation of different associations as bridging or bonding under both approaches, 
we now test whether the relation between (bridging and/or bonding) association membership 
and individuals’ civic attitudes is affected by the approach employed to distinguish bridging 
from bonding groups.  The dataset employed for this assessment derives from the APS survey 
of 2002 (sample size = 1477 individuals), which contains a large number of statements 
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probing individuals’ attitudes along various dimensions.10  Using a principal components 
analysis (PCA), we employ individuals’ responses to these statements (ranging from 
‘completely agree’ to ‘completely disagree’ in five steps) to construct indices for five 
different civic attitudes: Utilitarian individualism, Intolerance towards immigrants, 
Acceptance of non-conformism, Feelings of insecurity and Political powerlessness (for 
technical details of the components, see Appendix A).   
 
As the theoretical underpinnings for a relation between association membership and these five 
attitudes have been extensively discussed in the prior literature (see, e.g., Billiet 1998; 
Hooghe 2003a, b; Freitag 2003; Coffé and Geys 2007c), we immediately turn to the empirical 
model (subscript i referring to individuals):11 
 
Valuei =  a + b1 Membershipi + Controlsi + ei   
 
Valuei represents the component scores of the five civic attitudes that are the respective 
dependent variables during the analysis.  Membershipi is a vector of three variables measuring 
the number of memberships an individual claims in each of three categories of associations: 
the four most bridging associations, the four most bonding ones and the eight remaining 
middle-of-the-road associations.  This three-way division is necessary from a theoretical point 
of view since ‘bonding and bridging are not either-or categories into which social networks 
can be neatly divided, but more or less dimensions’ (Putnam 2000: 23).  The specification of a 
middle range sharpens the distinction between the two ‘extremes’ of the scale and explicitly 
takes this more-or-less character into account (see also, Coffé and Geys 2007c).12  Note that, 
since the two approaches to bridging and bonding lead associations to be placed in various 
groups across this three-way division (leading to different values of these membership 
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variables), we are able to test whether the regression results depend on the approach 
employed.  Finally, we add a set of control variables based on findings in the prior literature 
(e.g. Billiet 1998; Putnam 2000; Hooghe 2003a, b; Freitag 2003; Coffé and Geys 2007c): i.c. 
respondent’s extent of religiosity (measured by frequency of church practice), gender, age (in 
years), level of education, marital status, number of children, and hours of television watching 
on weekdays.13   
__________________ 
Table III 
about here 
__________________ 
 
The results for the central membership variables are given in Table III (full results are 
relegated to Appendix B – where it can be seen that all controls behave in line with previous 
findings).  Evidently, both methodological approaches to bridging and bonding provide some 
support for the idea that members’ civic attitudes are more pro-social and tolerant in bridging 
networks than bonding ones (in line with Putnam 2000; Putnam and Goss 2002; Marshall and 
Stolle 2004).  Yet, crucially, the relation is much stronger for external bridging than for 
internal bridging.  Not only are the coefficient estimates larger for bridging groups in the 
bottom half of Table III (compared to the top half of the table), they are often also statistically 
significantly different from those of the other two groups (which only holds for political 
powerlessness in the top panel of Table III).  Hence, the ‘superior performance’ of the 
bridging (and middle) group compared to the bonding group in terms of members’ pro-social 
attitudes is (statistically) rather weak for internal bridging/bonding, but quite strong when 
focusing on external bridging/bonding.  This, together with the analysis in section 3.1, 
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underlines that both approaches fail to capture the exact same concepts (at odds with the 
expectations generated by their use of the same terminology).14 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Although civic engagement has often been hailed as a cure for many ills, it does not guarantee 
the end of all sorrows.  Indeed, it may have a dark side too in the form of, for example, social 
exclusion.  This recognition has recently led to a distinction between bonding and bridging 
social networks.  The explicit acknowledgement in this distinction that not all forms of 
community engagement have the same external effects, gives it the potential to serve a crucial 
role in the debate linking civic engagement to social outcomes.  However, at present, both 
concepts remain under-defined and effectively run the risk of stereotyping bridging and 
bonding as good and bad respectively.  Moreover, this conceptual fuzziness invites various 
interpretations of what exactly is meant by bridging and bonding.   
 
In the present paper, we empirically compared the two main interpretations that have been 
brought forward: one based on interconnections between networks (coined external bridging 
here) and one exploiting information on intra-network heterogeneity (termed internal bridging 
here).  The results – using Flemish survey data on voluntary association membership – show 
that both approaches are not only conceptually different, but also lead to different empirical 
results.  Firstly, associations may be placed on different ends of the bridging/bonding divide 
based on the approach employed.  Secondly, the statistical and substantive significance of the 
relation between (bridging or bonding) membership and civic attitudes is strongly affected by 
the approach taken to distinguish bridging from bonding networks.  Specifically, the link with 
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pro-social attitudes is much stronger when one defines bridging potential as the 
interconnectedness of an association (i.e. external bridging) than when one looks at its socio-
economic diversity (i.e. internal bridging). 
 
Future empirical work should clearly attempt to determine the general nature of these 
findings.  Relying only on Flemish data, as in the present study, does not allow us to draw 
general conclusions.  However, even when Flanders should turn out to be a ‘special case’, our 
results still invoke questions concerning the conditions under which both approaches do 
provide similar results (interpretable as the ‘scope conditions’ for such a relation; cfr. Lakatos 
1981; Elster 1989).  Moreover, following a stronger form of falsification theory (cfr. Popper 
1963), the present findings lead to an outright rejection of the notion that both approaches to 
bridging and bonding quantify the same thing (as suggested by their use of similar 
terminology and theoretical argumentation).  In either case, serious methodological as well as 
conceptual, theoretical questions are brought to the surface.  First and foremost, we need to 
clarify – at a theoretical, conceptual level – what exactly is meant by bridging and bonding.  
Then, it should be addressed whether both approaches (or interpretations) existing today tap 
into distinct dimensions of the bridging and bonding divide.  Do both have their own specific 
value in the argumentation (and, if so, what are these specific contributions) or is one of them 
more ‘appropriate’ (and, if so, which one)?  These questions are crucial to consider in future 
work on bridging and bonding social networks and their (alleged) differential effects on 
individuals and the broader society.   
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APPENDIX A 
We regard five civic attitudes, measured through a principal component analysis (PCA) of 
individuals’ answers to related statements (four to eight depending on the attitude under 
consideration).  Below, we present the statements employed for each attitude as well as the 
information about the PCA: i.e. component weights for each statement, eigenvalue, 
percentage of explained variance and Cronbach alfa of the component.   
 
Utilitarian individualism: eight statements 
0.79 In society, one better looks after himself/herself first. 
0.79 In society, one has to fight for his/her own position, the rest follows automatically. 
0.79 One should always pursue personal pleasure and not think too much about others. 
0.78 It is important to first strive for a prominent for yourself.  
0.75 One should take care of oneself first and defend ones own interests.  
0.69 What counts is money and power. The rest is hot air.  
0.66 Well-informed people can use this primarily to improve their own position. 
0.63 Striving for personal success is more important than having good relations with others.  
 
Eigenvalue 4.3 
Explained 
variance 
54% 
Cronbach Alfa  0.88 
 
Intolerance towards immigrants: four statements 
0.85 Immigrants come here to take advantage of our social welfare system. 
0.82 If the job-market deteriorates, immigrants should be sent back to their own countries. 
0.82 Muslims are a threat to our culture and traditions. 
0.80 In general, immigrants cannot be trusted. 
 
Eigenvalue 2.7 
Explained 
variance 
67% 
Cronbach Alfa  0.84 
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Acceptance of non-conformism: eight statements assessing individual’s acceptance of: 
0.75 Piercings. 
0.74 Wearing provocative clothing. 
0.74 Use of softdrugs (e.g. Cannabis). 
0.70 Having different partners while all partners are informed about this. 
0.64 Visiting a prostitute when one does not have a steady relation. 
0.60 The legal recognition of other forms of cohabitation than marriage.  
0.59 Buying goods that one knows are illegal copies. 
0.58 Consciously shocking people.  
 
Eigenvalue 3.6 
Explained 
variance 
45% 
Cronbach Alfa  0.83 
 
Feelings of insecurity: seven statements 
0.75 In the evening, one has to be very careful on the streets. 
0.72 Over the past ten years, streets have become more dangerous. 
0.71 I do not open the door when someone rings my doorbell in the evening or at night. 
0.70 Out of fear of being robbed, I always immediately lock the car when I get in. 
0.68 Alarm systems are no superfluous luxury these days.  
0.67 When I am on holiday, I dare not leave my house unguarded.  
0.66 The police are no longer able to protect us from criminals.  
 
Eigenvalue 3.4 
Explained 
variance 
49% 
Cronbach Alfa  0.82 
 
Political powerlessness: five statements 
0.81 Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion. 
0.78 Most politicians promise a lot, but they don’t do anything. 
0.73 There is no point to voting since parties do whatever they want. 
0.72 Politicians have never learnt to listen to ordinary people like me. 
0.64 If the government accepts an unjust law, there is little a citizen can do about that. 
 
Eigenvalue 2.7 
Explained 
variance 
54% 
Cronbach Alfa  0.78 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1: ‘Internal’ bridging and bonding memberships and civic attitudes (full results) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Utilitarian 
Individualism 
Intolerance 
towards 
immigrants 
Acceptance of 
non-
conformism 
Feelings of 
insecurity 
Political 
powerlessness 
Intercept 0.549 *** 
(2.60) 
-0.471 *** 
(-3.37) 
1.094 *** 
(9.80) 
-0.701 *** 
(-5.06) 
-0.714 *** 
(3.25) 
Religion 
(dummy: 1 = ‘Christian, but never 
to church’) 
0.055 
(0.77) 
0.254 *** 
(3.24) 
-0.196 *** 
(-2.94) 
0.050 
(0.66) 
-0.008 
(-0.10) 
Religion 
(dummy: 1 = ‘Christian and at most 
once a month to church’) 
-0.017 
(-0.26) 
0.208 *** 
(2.92) 
-0.378 *** 
(-5.86) 
0.125 * 
(1.70) 
-0.018 
(-0.24) 
Religion 
(dummy: 1 = ‘Christian and at least 
once a month to church’) 
-0.153 * 
(-1.66) 
0.053 
(0.57) 
-0.661 *** 
(-8.07) 
0.147 
(1.53) 
-0.045 
(-0.47) 
Children 
(number of children) 
-0.016 
(-0.74) 
-0.069 *** 
(-3.19) 
-0.006 
(-0.34) 
-0.069 *** 
(-3.43) 
-0.028 
(-1.31) 
Gender  
(dummy: 1 = male) 
0.157 *** 
(3.08) 
0.015 
(0.29) 
0.134 *** 
(3.08) 
-0.310 *** 
(5.84) 
0.036 
(0.70) 
Age 
(in years) 
-0.011  
(-1.23) 
0.013 *** 
(6.56) 
-0.019 *** 
(-11.85) 
0.018 *** 
(9.13) 
0.028 *** 
(3.15) 
Age squared 
 
0.0001 
(1.46) 
- - - -0.0002 ** 
(-2.23) 
Education  
(dummy for lower secondary) 
-0.350 *** 
(-3.74) 
-0.183 ** 
(-2.15) 
0.045 
(0.65) 
0.020 
(0.23) 
-0.066 
(-0.74) 
Education 
(dummy for higher secondary) 
-0.564 *** 
(-5.96) 
-0.345 *** 
(-3.95) 
0.245 *** 
(3.61) 
-0.014 
(-0.16) 
-0.232 *** 
(-2.62) 
Education 
(dummy for higher education) 
-0.800 *** 
(-8.17) 
-0.730 *** 
(-7.97) 
0.515 *** 
(7.02) 
-0.313 *** 
(-3.23) 
-0.571 *** 
(-5.94) 
Married 
 (dummy: 1 = married) 
0.068 
(1.11) 
0.095 * 
(1.64) 
-0.220 *** 
(-4.63) 
0.075 
(1.25) 
0.041 
(0.63) 
Television time 
(average hours/day) 
0.050 *** 
(2.59) 
0.053 ** 
(2.49) 
-0.048 *** 
(3.03) 
0.045 ** 
(1.96) 
0.051 ** 
(2.23) 
Bridging associations  
(number of memberships) 
-0.082 ** 
(-2.28) 
-0.020 
(-0.55) 
0.063 ** 
(2.05) 
-0.062 * 
(-1.67) 
-0.099 ** 
(-2.50) 
Middle group of 
associations 
(number of memberships) 
-0.150 *** 
(-4.59) 
-0.109 *** 
(-3.44) 
0.073 ** 
(2.46) 
-0.096 *** 
(-2.80) 
-0.076 ** 
(-2.19) 
Bonding associations 
(number of memberships) 
-0.028 
(-0.60) 
-0.016 
(-0.37) 
0.043 
(1.06) 
0.011 
(0.25) 
0.039 
(0.91) 
 
N 
R² 
 
1359 
16.55 
 
1293 
20.99 
 
1327 
39.69 
 
1267 
18.35 
 
1357 
13.12 
 
F (bridging = middle) 
F (bridging = bonding) 
F (middle = bonding) 
F (all coeff. equal) 
 
1.63 
0.73 
3.71 * 
1.98 
 
2.81 * 
0.01 
2.63 
1.97 
 
0.05 
0.15 
0.34 
0.17 
 
0.31 
1.06 
2.47 
1.25 
 
0.16 
5.07 ** 
3.78 * 
2.88 * 
Note: t-values based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors between brackets; *** significant at 1%, 
** at 5% and * at 10%.  N differs over the various specifications due to missing observations. 
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Table B2: ‘External’ bridging and bonding memberships and civic attitudes (full results) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Utilitarian 
Individualism 
Intolerance 
towards 
immigrants 
Acceptance of 
non-
conformism 
Feelings of 
insecurity 
Political 
powerlessness 
Intercept 0.416 * 
(1.95) 
-0.603 *** 
(-2.60) 
1.064 *** 
(5.26) 
-0.494 ** 
(-2.08) 
-0.779 *** 
(-3.55) 
Religion 
(dummy: 1 = ‘Christian, but never 
to church’) 
0.066 
(0.93) 
0.258 *** 
(3.32) 
-1.196 *** 
(2.93) 
0.058 
(0.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.05) 
Religion 
(dummy: 1 = ‘Christian and at 
most once a month to church’) 
-0.004 
(-0.06) 
0.217 *** 
(3.07) 
-0.379 *** 
(-5.92) 
0.136 * 
(1.87) 
-0.004 
(-0.05) 
Religion 
(dummy: 1 = ‘Christian and at 
least once a month to church’) 
-0.121 
(-1.32) 
0.073 
(0.81) 
-0.666 *** 
(-8.38) 
0.170 * 
(1.81) 
-0.005 
(-0.06) 
Children 
(number of children) 
-0.010 
(-0.49) 
-0.069 *** 
(-3.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.50) 
-0.059 *** 
(-2.95) 
-0.020 
(-0.94) 
Gender  
(dummy: 1 = male) 
0.116 ** 
(2.31) 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
0.137 *** 
(3.15) 
-0.342 ** 
(-6.53) 
-0.005 
(-0.09) 
Age 
(in years) 
-0.006 
(-0.63) 
0.018 * 
(1.87) 
-0.018 ** 
(-2.11) 
0.007 
(0.73) 
0.032 *** 
(3.39) 
Age squared 
 
0.0001 
(0.86) 
-0.0001 
(-0.52) 
-0.00001 
(-0.10) 
0.0001 
(1.16) 
-0.0002 ** 
(-2.49) 
Education  
(dummy for lower secondary) 
-0.345 *** 
(-3.71) 
-0.187 ** 
(-2.17) 
0.044 
(0.63) 
0.030 
(0.34) 
-0.067 
(-0.75) 
Education 
(dummy for higher secondary) 
-0.556 *** 
(-5.93) 
-0.344 *** 
(-3.93) 
0.245 *** 
(3.60) 
-0.002 *** 
(-0.03) 
-0.228 *** 
(-2.58) 
Education 
(dummy for higher education) 
-0.763 *** 
(-7.86) 
-0.707 *** 
(-7.62) 
0.520 *** 
(6.99) 
-0.273 *** 
(-2.81) 
-0.551 *** 
(-5.75) 
Married 
 (dummy: 1 = married) 
0.074 
(1.22) 
0.089 
(1.45) 
-0.221 *** 
(-4.17) 
0.113 * 
(1.72) 
0.048 
(0.75) 
Television time 
(average hours/day) 
0.046 ** 
(2.40) 
0.050 ** 
(2.41) 
-0.048 *** 
(-2.95) 
0.040 * 
(1.77) 
0.047 ** 
(2.13) 
Bridging associations  
(number of memberships) 
-0.216 *** 
(-4.51) 
-0.218 *** 
(-4.86) 
0.018  
(0.43) 
-0.129 *** 
(-2.64) 
-0.119 ** 
(-2.36) 
Middle group of 
associations 
(number of memberships) 
-0.102 *** 
(-3.66) 
-0.016 
(-0.61) 
0.077 *** 
(3.49) 
-0.066*** 
(-2.32) 
-0.070 ** 
(-2.40) 
Bonding associations 
(number of memberships) 
0.130 ** 
(2.16) 
0.078 
(1.30) 
0.082 * 
(1.68) 
0.100 * 
(1.71) 
0.113 ** 
(2.06) 
 
N 
R² 
 
1359 
17.49 
 
1293 
21.72 
 
1327 
39.74 
 
1267 
18.85 
 
1357 
13.38 
 
F (bridging = middle) 
F (bridging = 
bonding) 
F (middle = bonding) 
F (all coeff. equal) 
 
3.19 * 
18.28 *** 
11.10 *** 
9.40 *** 
 
11.76 *** 
13.84 *** 
1.84 
8.40 *** 
 
1.27 
0.96 
0.01 
0.72 
 
0.96 
7.93 *** 
5.88 ** 
4.27 ** 
 
0.57 
8.44 *** 
7.82 *** 
4.99 *** 
Note: t-values based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors between brackets; *** significant at 1%, 
** at 5% and * at 10%. N differs over the various specifications due to missing observations. 
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Table I: ‘Internal’ Bridging versus bonding association types in Flanders 
 
Note: Data taken from Coffé and Geys (2007a). 
 
Association type 
 
 
Sum of normalized  
diversity scores 
 
Hobby club  0.883 
 
(1) 
 
Humanitarian organizations 1.215 (2)  
Arts activities (literature, dance, theatre, music) 1.371 (3)  
Sports associations 1.878 (4)  
Neighbourhood committee  1.897 (5)  
Organizations aiding elderly, handicapped or 
deprived people 2.007
 
(6) 
 
Local community advisory and school council 2.350 (7)  
Associations linked to local pub 2.417 (8)  
Third world development and international peace 2.787 (9)  
Environmental and nature associations 2.969 (10)  
Fan club 3.133 (11)  
Socio-cultural associations 3.208 (12)  
Family organizations  3.366 (13)  
Youth associations 3.948 (14)  
Women’s groups 4.009 (15)  
Associations for retired people 
 
6.018 (16)  
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Table II: ‘External’ bridging versus bonding association types in Flanders 
 
Association type 
 
 
Number 
of 
members 
(MEMB) 
 
Size-corrected 
measure of 
interconnection 
(RESIDUALS) 
 
Third world development and international peace 
 
282 0.697 (1) 
Socio-cultural associations 560 0.351 (2) 
Local community advisory and school council 335 0.324 (3) 
Organizations providing aid to elderly, 
handicapped or deprived people 
 
466 0.183 (4) 
Arts activities (literature, dance, theatre, music) 488 0.147 (5) 
Neighbourhood committee 323 0.089 (6) 
Environmental and nature associations 396 0.084 (7) 
Family organizations  898 0.062 (8) 
Sports associations 1766 0.023 (9) 
Hobby club  492 -0.014 (10) 
Humanitarian organizations 585 -0.124 (11) 
Women’s groups 573 -0.236 (12) 
Fan club 112 -0.299 (13) 
Youth associations 332 -0.313 (14) 
Associations for retired people 510 -0.420 (15) 
Associations linked to local pub 453 -0.544 (16) 
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Table III: Bridging and bonding memberships and civic attitudes 
 
Variable 
 
Utilitarian 
Individualism
Intolerance 
towards 
immigrants 
Acceptance 
of non-
conformism 
Feelings of 
insecurity 
Political 
powerlessness
 
Internal bridging 
Bridging associations  
(number of memberships) 
-0.082 ** 
(-2.28) 
-0.020 
(-0.55) 
0.063 ** 
(2.05) 
-0.062 * 
(-1.67) 
-0.099 ** 
(-2.50) 
Middle group of 
associations 
(number of memberships) 
-0.150 *** 
(-4.59) 
-0.109 *** 
(-3.44) 
0.073 ** 
(2.46) 
-0.096 *** 
(-2.80) 
-0.076 ** 
(-2.19) 
Bonding associations 
(number of memberships) 
-0.028 
(-0.60) 
-0.016 
(-0.37) 
0.043 
(1.06) 
0.011 
(0.25) 
0.039 
(0.91) 
 
F (bridging = middle) 
F (bridging = bonding) 
F (middle = bonding) 
F (all coeff. equal) 
 
1.63 
0.73 
3.71 * 
1.98 
 
2.81 * 
0.01 
2.63 
1.97 
 
0.05 
0.15 
0.34 
0.17 
 
0.31 
1.06 
2.47 
1.25 
 
0.16 
5.07 ** 
3.78 * 
2.88 * 
 
R² 
 
16.55 
 
20.99 
 
39.69 
 
18.35 
 
13.12 
 
External bridging 
Bridging associations  
(number of memberships) 
-0.216 *** 
(-4.51) 
-0.218 *** 
(-4.86) 
0.018  
(0.43) 
-0.129 *** 
(-2.64) 
-0.119 ** 
(-2.36) 
Middle group of 
associations 
(number of memberships) 
-0.102 *** 
(-3.66) 
-0.016 
(-0.61) 
0.077 *** 
(3.49) 
-0.066*** 
(-2.32) 
-0.070 ** 
(-2.40) 
Bonding associations 
(number of memberships) 
0.130 ** 
(2.16) 
0.078 
(1.30) 
0.082 * 
(1.68) 
0.100 * 
(1.71) 
0.113 ** 
(2.06) 
 
F (bridging = middle) 
F (bridging = bonding) 
F (middle = bonding) 
F (all coeff. equal) 
 
3.19 * 
18.28 *** 
11.10 *** 
9.40 *** 
 
11.76 *** 
13.84 *** 
1.84 
8.40 *** 
 
1.27 
0.96 
0.01 
0.72 
 
0.96 
7.93 *** 
5.88 ** 
4.27 ** 
 
0.57 
8.44 *** 
7.82 *** 
4.99 *** 
 
R² 
 
17.49 
 
21.72 
 
39.74 
 
18.85 
 
13.38 
N 1359 1293 1327 1267 1357 
Note: t-values based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors between brackets; *** 
significant at 1 per cent, ** at 5 per cent and * at 10 per cent.  N differs over the various specifications 
due to missing observations.  F-tests reflect significance of the difference between coefficients of 
different groups of associations. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  Since all papers proposing and/or using methods to distinguish bridging from bonding social networks 
concentrate on voluntary association membership, we follow this approach.  Clearly, however, individuals 
also interact in other settings (e.g. schools or the workplace).  While this implies that a focus on associations 
is best seen as a partial analysis and should be complemented by information on people’s informal networks, 
it does not affect the general nature of the methods themselves. 
2  It is interesting to note that the terminology employed here mirrors the importance attached to bridges in 
social network formation theory (e.g. Weimann 1982; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004).  Such bridges 
are in this literature seen as crucial links between different groups, allowing for a wider dissemination of 
knowledge, understanding and information than would be feasible without them.  In sociology – and 
drawing on ‘The strength of weak ties’ by Granovetter (1973) – a very similar argument is raised in the 
theory of ‘structural holes’ by Burt (1992, 2001).  Relationships spanning holes in a social structure are 
argued to provide an important opportunity and advantage for those involved. 
3  We include active and passive members since the effects of active and passive membership are often found 
to be only marginally different (see Wollebaek and Selle 2003, Hooghe 2003a and Stutzer and Frey 2006). 
4  The ideal dataset would involve (exhaustive) data at the level of the individual associations.  Unfortunately, 
such data are, to the best of our knowledge, unavailable. 
5  Over- or under-representation of given socio-economic groups hereby implies that their share in the 
association is larger or smaller than in the overall population.  Alternatively, one could regard the extent to 
which members distinguish themselves from each other (rather than from the overall population) (e.g. Stolle 
2001; Li et al. 2003). 
6  It is important to adequately define the comparison population.  While in small, homogenous countries the 
entire population may be an accurate yardstick, in large countries where regional variations in population 
composition are significant, the demographic profile of a more localized population may be more desirable.  
Given the small size of Flanders and the minor regional differences in population composition, we employ 
the entire Flemish population as a reference group. 
7  While the APS-surveys include 22 association types, six are disregarded here.  Health care associations are 
excluded since membership in these is compulsory in Belgium.  Self-help groups and the white protest 
movement lack sufficient members in the sample to allow reliable analysis.  Unions, political parties and 
religious groups are excluded as these are most likely to harbour a diverse set of homogeneous associations 
(e.g. labour unions are grouped into one association ‘type’ with employers’ organizations and retailers’ 
associations).  This may lead the analysis to designate them as more bridging than is justified based on the 
underlying associations (see also Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Coffé and Geys, 2007a). Still, their inclusion 
only marginally affects the ranking of the remaining association types from most to least bridging (Coffé 
and Geys, 2007a). 
8  This obviously does not imply that association size as such is irrelevant and should be discarded.  In fact, 
larger associations are likely to have a larger impact than smaller groups in terms of their social 
consequences.  The ‘correction’ applied here does not negate this.  It merely avoids biased inferences by 
controlling for the lower interconnections of large associations deriving solely from size differences. 
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9  As expected, the relation between CONNECTi and MEMBi is significantly negative (t-value = -2.72; p = 
0.02) – indicating that larger associations are less interconnected.  For example, members of the largest 
organisation type (i.e. sports associations) have on average 1.27 additional memberships (with 63% having 
at least one additional membership) whereas those in the smallest organisation type (i.e. organisations for 
third world development and international peace) have on average 2.76 extra memberships (with almost 
87% of the members having additional memberships).  Importantly, this relation is not particular to our 
dataset.  Using World Value Studies data Paxton (2002) finds trade unions, religious groups and sports 
associations to be the most isolated (or bonding) groups.  Peace, human rights and environmental 
organizations are most connected (or bridging).  As trade unions and sports groups are (much) larger than 
human rights and peace organizations, this suggests the general nature of the size-related bias indicated 
above.   
10  The larger dataset used above could not be employed here as the attitudinal questions were, unfortunately, 
much less extensive in all but the 2002 wave of the survey. 
11  As in all studies of this type, the direction of the causal link between participation and attitudes is not self-
evident.  Attitudes may differ due to socialization or self-selection effects.  Given the cross-sectional 
character of the dataset, we cannot address this issue here.  However, as our main intention is to assess the 
possible difference between the two methodological approaches to bridging and bonding, this inability to 
pin-point causality is not overly problematic. 
12  As a robustness check, we estimated the model including either three or five associations in the bridging and 
bonding categories and the remaining associations in the middle category.  The results are comparable to the 
ones presented in the main text and are available upon request. 
13  Inclusion of a respondent’s income was never statistically significant once education was controlled for and 
strongly reduced the number of observations.  Hence, we did not retain it in the final estimations.  The 
results, however, are robust to the reduction in sample size when this variable is included. 
14  Our findings may be affected by the institutional design of the voluntary sector: i.e. the different roles 
played by the various organizations, their relations to the wider political setting, their own institutional 
design and so on.  Indeed, institutional design may be a crucial factor in assessing ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ 
networks (cfr. Coffé and Geys 2007a: 132) and may help to explain why individuals’ civic attitudes vary 
across different types of voluntary activity.  As such, it is important in future research to distinguish between 
these factors and those related to the socialisation or self-selection effects referred to above. 
